We show how to use model classes of partial logic to de ne semantics of general knowledge-based reasoning.
Introduction
As opposed to theoretical reasoning, such as in mathematics, where all predicates are exact, 1 and a single contradiction destroys the entire theory, knowledge-based reasoning has to be able to deal with inexact predicates (e.g. from empirical domains) having truth value gaps, and with knowledge bases containing contradictory items but being still informative. Therefore, partial logics allowing both for truth-value gaps and for inconsistency are natural candidates for modelling knowledge-based reasoning.
In knowledge representation, two di erent notions of falsity arise in a natural way. Certain facts are implicitly false by default by being not veri ed in any intended model of the knowledge base. Others are explicitly false by virtue of a direct proof of their falsity, corresponding to their falsi cation in all intended models. These two kinds of falsity in knowledge representation are captured by the two negations, called weak and strong, of partial logic. 2 In the monotonic base system of partial logic, weak negation corresponds to classical negation by 1 . Introduction virtue of a straightforward translation of partial logic into classical logic which is discussed in section 3. In the nonmonotonic re nements of partial logic, discussed in sections 4 and 5, weak negation corresponds to negation-as-failure, and hence can be used to express local Closed-World Assumptions, default rules, and the like.
As opposed to the traditional logical notion of a theory being a (possibly deductively closed) set of formulas, the emerging concept of a knowledge base (KB) is richer both in terms of the expressive structure of a KB and in terms of the meaningful restrictions imposed upon it. Typically, a KB consists of facts and various kinds of rules. In this paper, we shall only consider deduction rules. Facts correspond to sentences of an appropriately restricted language, and deduction rules correspond to non-schematic (Gentzen) sequents. While facts express extensional knowledge, rules express intensional knowledge. This dichotomy of the knowledge representation language also a ects the use of the universal quanti er: a generic law, for instance, is rather expressed in the form of a rule and not by means of a universal sentence.
In real world knowledge bases like, for instance, relational or deductive databases, it is essential to be able to infer negative information by means of minimal (resp. stable) reasoning, i.e. drawing inferences on the basis of minimal (resp. stable) models. Relational databases, being nite sets of tables the rows of which represent atomic sentences, have traditionally been viewed as nite models. On this account, answering a query F is rather based on the model relation, M j = F, where M is the nite interpretation corresponding to the database , and not on an inference relation. However, especially with respect to the generalization of relational databases (e.g. in order to allow for incomplete information), it seems to be more adequate to regard a relational database as a set of atomic sentences A , and to infer a query F whenever it holds in the unique minimal model of A , i.e.
A `F :, Min(Mod(A )) Mod(F) , M j = F While minimal models are adequate for de nite extensional knowledge bases (such as relational databases), a re nement of the notion of minimality, called paraminimality, is needed to capture the inclusiveness of disjunctive knowledge. Minimal and paraminimal models are discussed in section 4. It turns out, that for a deductive knowledge base, corresponding to a set of sequents, minimal (resp. paraminimal) models are not adequate because they are not able to capture the directedness of rules. We, therefore, propose stable models as the intended models of deductive knowledge bases in section 5. We show that Gelfond's and Lifschitz's notion of an answer set of an extended logic program GL90] corresponds to a special case of our notion of a stable model of a sequent set.
Since in practice large knowledge bases cannot be expected to be free of inconsistent information, one needs a notion of inference which is able to tolerate inconsistency and at the same time still as logically conservative as possible. In order to deal with possibly inconsistent KBs, the simplest way is to refer to minimally inconsistent four-valued models as proposed in Pri89] . In summary, we get an`orthogonal' combination of minimally inconsistent paraminimally stable models as the preferred models of a deductive knowledge base.
Preliminaries 3 Preliminaries
A signature = hRel; ExRel; Const; Funi consists of a set of relation symbols Rel, a set ExRel Rel of exact relation symbols, a set of constant symbols, and a set of function symbols.
The set of all variables, Var, is fx 0 ; x 1 ; : : :g; we will also use x; y; : : :, however. U( ) denotes the set of all ground terms of . The logical functors are ?; ;^; _; j; ; 8; 9; where ?; ; j and are called weak negation, strong negation, exclusive disjunction, and material implication, respectively. 3 L( ) is the smallest set containing the atomic formulas of , and being closed with respect to the following conditions: if F; G 2 L( ), then f F ; ?F; FĜ ; F _ G; FjG; F G; 9xF; 8xFg L( ). L 0 ( ) denotes the corresponding set of sentences (closed formulas). For sublanguages of L( ) formed by means of a subset F of the logical functors, we write L( ; F). With respect to a signature we de ne the following sublanguages: At( ) = L( ; ;), the set of all atomic formulas (also called atoms); Lit( ) = L( ; f g), the set of all literals; Lit 0 ( ) the set of ground literals (also called Herbrand basis), and XLit( ) = Lit( ) f?l : l 2 Lit( )g, the set of all extended literals. We introduce the following conventions. When L 0 L( ) is some sublanguage, L 0 0 denotes the corresponding set of sentences. If the signature does not matter, we omit it and write, e.g., L instead of L( ). Furthermore, e X = f F : F 2 Xg. Let L L( ) be a nonempty language. An operation C : 2 L ! 2 L is called an inference operation, and the pair hL; Ci is said to be an inference system. The corresponding inference relation`is de ned by X`F i F 2 C(X). An A model-theoretic system hL; I; j =i is determined by a language L, a set I whose elements are called interpretations and a model relation j = I L between interpretations and formulas. With every model-theoretic system hL; I; j =i, we can associate a model operator Mod I , a consequence operation C I , and a consequence relation j = I in the following way. Let X L, then the associated model operator is de ned as Mod I (X) = fI 2 I : I j = Xg, where I j = X i for every F 2 X : I j = F. The associated consequence operation is de ned by C I (X) = fF 2 L : Mod I (X) Mod I (F)g, and nally X j = I F i F 2 C I (X). For a subset K I the theory of K, denoted by Th(K) is de ned by Th(K) = fF 2 L : I j = F f.a. I 2 Kg. A model-theoretic system hL; I; j =i is called compact if C I is compact. An inference system hL; C L i is called correct, resp. complete, with respect to the model-theoretic system hL; I; j =i i C L (X) C I (X), resp. C L (X) = C I (X). In the case of completeness we also say that hL; I; j =i represents hL; C L i.
If X is a set of sets, then Fin(X) denotes its restriction to nite elements. If Y is an partially ordered set, then Min(Y ) denotes the set of all minimal elements of Y , i.e. Min(Y ) = fX 2 Y j :9X 0 2 Y : X 0 < Xg, and Max(Y ) denotes the set of all maximal elements of Y , i.e. Max(Y ) = fX 2 Y j :9X 0 2 Y : X 0 > Xg.
Partial Logics with Two Kinds of Negation
In this section we start with a brief introduction of partial model-theory, and then we present their underlying axiomatics. Since partial logic adopts its name from its alternative at the very core of denotational semantics, consisting of a shift from total to partial truth-value assignments, this order of presentation seems most natural.
More speci cally, we begin with a presentation of partial rst-order models. Then we will discuss some issues of the expressivity of certain languages for reasoning on the basis of partial models. An essential feature of partial models is the fact that they allow to distinguish between two types of extensional 4 negative information, i.e. between the explicit falsity and the non-truth of a proposition.
After this, we will show how partial rst-order logics can be translated into classical rstorder logic. This result does not mean that partial logic is abundant 5 but rather shows how well-known meta-theoretic theorems can be adopted from classical logic. An immediate consequence, which is directly relevant for this paper, is compactness.
In the third subsection we will present Gentzen-style axiomatizations of partial logics. Other styles of derivation, like Hilbert-style axiomatization and natural deduction, are also possible. The reasons for us to chose in favor of the Gentzen-style comes down to its metatheoretical convenience and its brevity.
Model Theory
The model-theory of partial logic is slightly deviant from the standard Tarskian one of classical logic. The only di erence is that the predicate structure is somewhat richer. As already stressed above, the central idea of partial logic is the distinction between falsity and nontruth. In the partial predicate logics which we will discuss this distinction is implemented by assigning a positive and a negative extension to each predicate.
De nition 1 (Interpretation) Let Roughly speaking, extensionality says that the information is only about one speci c information state or model. Intensional information comes from other information state which are related in one way or another to the information state at hand. An example of an intensional treatment of negation can be found in intuitionistic logic. In this setting, : means that every hypothetical veri cation of will lead to a contradiction. In other words, for determining the truth of : we need to take`later' states of information, which contain more information than the current one, into account.
5
Opponents of partial logic may argue that the translation actually`proves' the abundance of partial logic. We disregard such an abstract position, because for practical purposes, partial logic arises as the most natural model-theoretic method for interpreting the two kinds of extensional negative information that we mentioned above.
R I e R I U ar(R) I ; and in the special case of an exact relation symbol R 2 ExRel, R I e R I = U ar(R) I ; where ar(R) denotes the arity of R. While many predicates from the ontology of empirical domains are inexact, i.e. have truth value gaps, analytical predicates (such as equality, or being a prime number), and legally de ned predicates (such as being eligible, or having a certain nationality) are exact.
In the sequel we shall often simply say 'interpretation' instead of 'partial interpretation'. The class of all partial -interpretations is denoted by I 4 ( ). We de ne the classes of coherent (sometime also called 3-valued) , of total, and of total coherent (or 2-valued) -interpretations by I c ( ) = fI 2 I 4 ( ) : R I \ e R I = ; for all R 2 Relg I t ( ) = fI 2 I 4 ( ) : R I e R I = U ar(R) I for all R 2 Relg I 2 ( ) = I c ( ) \ I t ( ) The satisfaction relation j = between an interpretation, a valuation and a formula is de ned inductively on the complexity of formulas F 2 L( ) and F 2 L( ). Such a dichotomous induction is needed, because veri cation and falsi cation are independent truth-value assignments in partial logic. 6 A valuation over an interpretation I is a function : Var ! U I , which can naturally be extended to arbitrary terms by (f(t 1 ; : : :; t n )) = f I ( (t 1 ); : : :; (t n )) Note that for a constant c, being a 0-ary function, we have (c) = c I . For a tuple t 1 ; : : :; t n we will also writet when its length is of no relevance. We write = x , if two valuations ; are equal except for the variable x: (y) = (y) for all y 2 V ar n fxg.
De nition 2 (Satisfaction Relation) I; j = R(t 1 ; : : :; t n ) i h (t 1 ); : : :; (t n )i 2 R I I; j = R(t 1 ; : : :; t n ) i h (t 1 ); : : :; (t n )i 2 e R I I; j = F^G i I; j = F and I; j = G I; j = F _ G i I; j = F or I; j = G I; j = ?F i I; 6 j = F I; j = 8xF i I; j = F for all = x I; j = 9xF i I; j = F for certain = x All other cases of formula composition are treated by the following DeMorgan-style rewrite rules expressing the falsi cation of compound formulas: 6 Most often these two relations are also written in a di erent fashion, e.g. j = for veri cation and =j for falsi cation. Such a treatment is needed when the strong negation is not available. In this paper, we will not deal with strong negation free sublanguages. Note that this de nition of equivalence does not capture uniform substitutability. For example p^ p c q^ q, but (p^ p) 6 j = c (q^ q). In general, substitutability of F by G can be regained by requiring that F G and G F. It is not hard to show that the general case of I 4 ( ) can be reduced to classical logic. Because the propositions F and F are completely independent, they can be understood as two di erent propositions in a two-valued setting. This can be made explicit by a dichotomous translation function, which has been given (in a slightly di erent way) by Gilmore Gil74] , but can also be found in Feferman Fef84] 
Corollary 2 (L owenheim-Skolem) Let Corollary 3 Let = 4,t or c.
(1) Compactness: X L( ) is -satis able i every nite subset of X is -satis able.
(2) Finiteness: X j = F i there is a nite set Y X such that Y j = F.
Propositional Expressivity and Normal Forms
Let us suppose that we only deal with the sublanguage Prop( ) := L 0 ( ;^; _; ; ?). A -interpretation I can then be understood as a partial truth-value assignment V I : At 0 ( ) ! 2 f0;1g . The simple reason to do so is that we wish to discuss the expressivity of connectives, rather than that of quanti ers. The corresponding partial truth-value assignment: V I (P) is the subset of f0; 1g such that 1 2 V I (P) i P 2 D I 0 2 V I (P) i P 2 D I In other words, f0; 1g stands for over-valued, f0g for falsity, f1g for truth, and ; for undervalued. The set of all truth-values, f;; f0g; f1g;f0;1gg, will be called four. The subsets 7 The stronger versions with G 2 At( ) also hold. f;; f0g; f1gg, ff0g; f1g;f0; 1gg and ff0g; f1gg will be denoted by three, three' and two, These issues of expressivity are not of purely theoretical concern. For example, given a subclass of models which behaves computationally very well, then we want to know the exact language which describes such a class. 8 Furthermore, if we want to axiomatize an extension of the model class I 2 , then we need to know whether connectives are independent or can be de ned in terms of others. We know for sure, that the former class requires explicit reference within such an axiom system. Last but not least, we also want to have a formal understanding what we really gain in expressivity, once we extend a model class. For example, the formula ?(P _ P) has no 2-models, but is c-satis able, which makes clear that ? really adds expressive power to the connectives and _.
In other words, given a class of models, we wish to know the underlying languages of both super-and subclasses.
Formally (8i 2 f1; : : :; ng : x i y i ) ) ](x 1 ; : : :; x n ) ](y 1 ; : : :; y n ).
In V 4 we also need o for getting the same complete expressivity over the same class of persistent connectives Mus95]. 10 In most cases, functional expressivity of a propositional language can be demonstrated by means of so-called normal forms in the language, which speci es the class of satisfying truth-value assignments in an obvious way. In this section we only discuss the language with complete expressivity for V 4 , V c , V t and V 2 . De nition 7 If X is a set of formulas, then X := f F j F 2 Xg for a given unary connective . If X = fF 1 ; : : :; F n g is a non-empty nite set of formula then V X := F 1:
: :^F n and W X := F 1 _ : : : _ F n . 11
A conjunct form is a formula of the form: A prenex formula F 2 L( ) has the form Q 1 x 1 : : :Q n x n G(x 1 ; : : :; x n ; y 1 ; : : :; y m ), where G is quanti er free and Q i 2 f8; 9g. G is called the matrix of F and is denoted by matrix(F).
9
The connective set f ;^g has complete expressivity over so-called closed persistent connectives in Vc Ben84]. Closed connectives always obtain a classical value, f0g or f1g, if all its arguments have classical values.
10
This result for persistence gives us immediately an answer to the question for which class of formulas 2-satis ability is the same as c-satis ability: all the formulas which can be de ned in terms of u, and^.
11
Of course, this is not a well-de ned formula, but because of commutativity of _ and^this choice is unique op to logical equivalence.
Proposition 4 (Propositional Normal Form) Every propositional formula is 4-equivalent to either a disjunction of 4-conjunct forms, ?, o or u. Analogously, such a formula is 3-equivalent to ?, u or a disjunction of 3-conjunct forms, and t-equivalent to ?, o or a disjunction of t-conjunct forms.
In general, it is not possible to obtain precise predicate logical version of proposition 4. Most often, so-called prenex normal forms are used to de ne versions of the normal form result above for the predicate logical case.
Proposition 5 (Prenex Normal Form) For every formula F(x 1 ; : : :; x n ) 2 L( ) there are prenex formulas G(x 1 ; : : :; x n ); H(x 1 ; : : :; x n ) 2 L( ) such that (1) F 4 G, and F 4 H; (2) matrix(G) = W X, X is a set of conjunct forms, matrix(H) = V Y , Y is a set of disjunct forms.
Proof Theory
In this subsection we will present sequent calculi for partial logics. As mentioned earlier, other styles of derivation calculi are also possible. There are several reasons to chose for the sequential style. First, they make the axiomatic di erences between di erent partial logics and classical logic immediately visible. Second, meta-theoretic proofs about the relations between deduction and model-theory, such as correctness and completeness proofs, bene t from a sequential proof theory. Third, in many cases sequential systems turn out to be shorter. 12 For example, general completeness results for functionally complete languages, can be easily be transformed to completeness proofs for poorer sublanguages.
De nition 8 (Sequent) A sequent s is an expression of the form In partial predicate logic, this advantage of sequential systems does not become sharply evident. A branch of partial logic, which surely bene ts in this respect from sequential axiomatization is partial modal logic, as have been shown in Jaspars Jas94].
with s i 2 Seq( ) for all i 2 f1; : : :; ng. The elements of fs 1 ; : : :; s n g are called the assumptions of R, and s n+1 is called the conclusion of R. If n = 0, that is rules without assumptions, we say that R is axiomatic, and simply write s 1 . A sequential system s is a set of sequential inference rules. Every conclusion of an axiomatic rule in s is said to be s-derivable in 0-steps. If Below we will present sequential systems for the partial logics which have been discussed earlier. As usual, we distinguish structural rules from introduction rules. Structural rules are syntactically independent of the logic which we are axiomatizing. Introduction rules stipulate the meaning of logical functors in a proof-theoretic fashion. Logical functors are introduced both in the head of a sequent (l-introduction) and in the body of a sequent (r-introduction). Furthermore, we distinguish between rules which introduce a new compound proposition as being true and those which de ne the falsity of a new compound proposition which then appears in the scope of the strong negation within the conclusion of the rule. 13 Every introduction rule is speci ed by an abbreviation of the form x v , where x 2 fl; rg (left or right), v 2 ftrue; falseg and speci es the connective or quanti er which is introduced.
Below we give a presentation of the rules which are relevant for the axiomatization of partial logic. Instead of X fFg we write X; F.
Structural Rules This set of structural rules will be called struc.
13
In FLV92] so-called quadrants have been introduced, which can be understood as a kind of four-placed sequents: XjX 0 ) Y jY 0 . The truth-conditional reading of such a quadrant is that all models which verify all members of X and falsify all members of X 0 , verify at least one member of Y or falsify at least one member of Y 0 . This approach makes falsity introduction possible within the derivational format and is therefore somewhat more elegant. If we wish to axiomatize -free sublanguages, such a choice would even be necessary in order to obtain complete inference systems in a sequential fashion. . Simply substitute ?F for the occurrences F in l false and r false and we obtain l false ? and r false ? respectively. The complete set of these falsity rules will be called false.
We de ne the following sequential systems: 2 = struc (true n fr true o; l true ug) c = struc (true n fr true ; r true og) (false n fr false og) t = struc (true n fl true ; l true ug) (false n fl false ug) 4 = (c \ t) fl v u; r w o j v; w 2 ftrue; falsegg Below we will present completeness results of these systems with respect to the corresponding model-theoretic consequence relations. This completeness only holds when we presuppose the absence of exact predicates within the underlying signature. If contains exact predicates, we need to strengthen the systems c and 4 with a straightforward compensation for the loss of fr true g. Let L( ex ) be the sublanguage of L( ) which consists of all the proposition that only contain exact predicates. The systems c-ex and 4-ex evolve from adding the rule r true ex to c and 4, respectively. This additional rule has the following form:
Observation 1 The di erences between 2, c, t, and 4 can also be described by means of relativized versions of contraposition. In 2 we have that This is a form of contraposition for strong negation. In all the other systems we obtain this contraposition rule at least for the weak negation. The systems c and t have mixed versions of the rule of contraposition:
The following proposition presents the completeness of the sequential systems of the previous paragraph. In fact, for the logic whose underlying language is functionally complete, these results can be already obtained by means of the translation of de nition 6. The partial results of soundness are the left-to-right directions of the equivalences in the above proposition. These results can be checked by a straightforward induction on the length of derivation.
In order to give an ordinary Henkin-style proof of these completeness theorems, we need to de ne the notion of saturated sets. This is a generalization of the notion of maximally consistent sets, which is needed to prove the completeness for partial logics with poorer expressivity. Especially, when the weak negation is lacking, the requirement of maximal consistency is too strong.
De nition 11 (Saturation) Let Note that for every s-saturated X there exists no nite X 0 X such that`s X 0 ) ;. This property captures the s-consistency of X. 14 Taking Y 0 in 3.4 to be a singleton tells us that s-saturated sets are closed under s-deduction. If Y 0 has multiple elements, the de nition tells us that every`disjunctive' conclusion from X breaks down into at least one element of X. In other words, the information in X does not contain disjunctive uncertainty. Complete certainty is captured by the de ntion of term-saturation.
A further relevant observation here is that if a sequential system s contains struc and a rule X; F ) Y X ) F; Y , then s-saturated sets are the same as maximally s-consistent sets. Lemma 7 (Generalized Lindenbaum Lemma) Let X and Y be two nite subsets of the language L( ), and let s 2 f2; c; t; 4g. If 6 s X ) Y , then there exists a s-saturated set Z L( ) such that X Z and Y \ Z = ;.
The standard Lindenbaum lemma can be obtained by taking Y = ; in the general formulation above. Because saturation is the same as maximal consistency for systems with the l-true rule for negation, the classical result is the same as saying that every consistent set is a subset of a maximal consistent set.
The generalization of the classical Lindenbaum lemma is due to Aczel and Thomason . The generalization of the classical result evolved from independent succesful attempts to prove the completeness of intuitionistic predicate logic Acz68], Tho69] .
Most often, the proof of the generalized Lindenbaum lemma is presented by making use of syntactic expressivity of the language that one works with. In fact, the set of rules struc is enough to obtain the result Jas95]. If 6 s X ) Y , and fF i g i2IN is an enumeration of the language, we de ne the following sequence of sets of formulas:
X 0 = X X n+1 = ( X n fF n g if 6 s X n ; F n ) Y X n otherwise.
The limit of this sequence is an s-saturated set, which contains X and does not intersect Y .
In the completeness proofs of partial predicate logics, we need term-saturated sets instead of saturated sets. The (cheap) trick to obtain these term-saturated sets is to extend the language with a countably in nite number of additional constants (also called parameters). Let L( 0 ) be such an extension of L( ), and let X and Y be two nite subsets of the latter language. This result immediately follows from lemma 7 and by taking a unique fresh parameter as an instantiation for each existentially quanti ed formula to obtain the desired term-saturated set. 14 If`s X 0 ) ; then`X 0 ) F for all F by application of mon. Note that a sequential system s which contain the rules struc is conistent i 6s ; ) ;:
The following lemma, which is also called the truth lemma, tells us that a term-saturated set veri es exactly those formulas which it contains. To formulate this result properly, we associate with every s-term-saturated set X L( ) an interpretation I s X U I s X = the set of all closed terms of ; f I s X = f for all functions and constants f; P I s X = ft j P(t) 2 Xg; e P I s X = ft j P(t) 2 Xg for all predicates P.
Lemma 9 (Truth Lemma) Let s be a system which contains the rules struc, and let X be s-term-saturated:
The proof of this lemma consists of a fairly straightforward induction on the construction of formulas. In fact every connective or quanti er only uses its own introduction rules. This settles the completeness result also for poorer languages over the di erent model classes.
The nal argument of the completeness result is an immediate consequence of lemma 7, In this section we study several versions of nonmonotonic reasoning based on partial logic. In the rst subsection nonmonotonic reasoning is analysed in an abstract setting. This is done by using the concept of a deductive frame and its semantical counterpart, a model-theoretic frame. On this level of abstraction one can give a characterization of several kinds of partial propositional logic. The second subsection is devoted to Herbrand models. Several theorems are generalized to partial logics, in particular the proposition about canonical models of universal theory. In the third subsection minimal models are investigated. Then, a new class of models is introduced, the -paraminimal models of a universal theory which are a generalization of the good models of TEG93]. Subsection 4.4 concludes with an investigation of compactness properties of the introduced nonmonotonic model operators.
Inference Frames and Model-Theoretic Frames
Let L be a language and C : 2 L ! 2 L an inference operation. A condition on C is said to be pure if it concerns the operation alone without regard to its interrelations to classical consequence operation and truth-functional connectives. The most important pure conditions are the following.
It is not hard to verify that I s Z 2 I ( ) for all s-term-saturated sets Z.
An inference operation C is cumulative i C satis es inclusion, cut and cautious monotony. Besides the three conditions of cut, cautious monotony and cumulativity Mak93] emphasizes several mixed conditions of inference: supraclassicality, distributivity, and rationality. C is said to be supraclassical if it extends the usual consequence operation Cn of classical logic, ie. Cn(X) C(X) for all X L. Obviously, these mixed conditions can be formulated for any logic. 16 In order to obtain a semantics for a nonmonotonic inference system (L; C) we proceed in two steps: rst we have to nd an appropriate deductive basis (L; C L ; C); then we have to construct a model-theoretic semantics for the deductive system (L; C L ) which will nally yield a model-theoretic frame representing the deductive frame (L; C L ; C). A set X L is said to be deductively closed i C L (X) = X. X is deductively consistent For the construction of a semantics it is su cient to select a subset of Cs(L) representing the models. X is said to be relatively maximal (abbreviated r-maximal) i there is a formula F 2 L such that F 6 2 C L (X) and for every proper superset Y of X the condition F 2 C L (Y ) is satis ed. Obviously, every r-maximal set is deductively closed. Let rmax(L) Cs(L) be the set of all relatively maximal subsets wrt (L; C L ).
Proposition 13 (Lindenbaum-Tarski) Let (L; C L ) be a deductive system, X L, and F 6 2 C L (X), then there exists a maximal extension Y X, such that F 6 2 Y .
Observation 3 rmax(L) is smallest subsystem of Cs(L) representing a semantics for (L; C L ).
We call it the Lindenbaum-Tarski standard semantics (LT-semantics).
De nition 14 The inference operations C 4 ; C c ; C t ; C 2 can be characterized as follows. We restrict our consideration to the case of propositional logic. Let Ax 4 (Prop) be the following set of formulas: Proof (scetch for j = 4 ): A set X of formulas is said to be complete i the following conditions are ful lled:
F 6 2 X i ?F 2 X, F^G 2 X i fF; Gg X, F _ G 2 X i fF; Gg \ X 6 = ;, ?F 2 X i F 2 X, F 2 X i F 2 X, (F^G) 2 X i f F; Gg \ X 6 = ;, (F _ G) 2 X i f F; Gg X. If X is complete then the set I = fl 2 Lit 0 ( ) : l 2 Xg is a partial model of X. To prove the completeness theorem we assume X j = 4 F but X 6 4 F. By proposition 13 there is a maximal set Y X Ax 4 such that Y 6 4 F. It can be shown that Y is complete and deductively closed. This implies F 2 Y , hence ?F 2 Y . Then there exists a model I j = Y such that I 6 j = F. This is a contradiction to X j = 4 F. Notice that, strictly speaking, we de ne the ground diagram, and not the full diagram.
Observation 6 There are consistent sets X L 0 ( ) without a Herbrand model: X = fP(a); 8x(P(x) P(f(x)); 9x(?P(x))g. Let = hRel; ExRel; Const; Funi be a signature, I a partial -interpretation, and U 1 U I . The restriction of I to U 1 is a partial interpretation J , denoted by J = I # U 1 , which is de ned by the following conditions:
(1) the subset U 1 is closed with respect to the functions ff I : f 2 Fung, and fc I : c 2 Constg U 1 ; (2) J is said to be a substructure of I if there is a subset U 1 U I such that J = I # U 1 .
Proposition 15 Let 8x 1 : : :x m A(x 1 ; : : :; x m ; y 1 ; : : :; y n ) = B(y 1 ; : : :; y n ) 2 L( ) be a universal formula,A(x; y) quanti er free, I 2 Mod c ( ), and I; j = B(y 1 ; : : :; y n ), an evaluation and (y 1 ) = a 1 ; : : :; (y n ) = a n . Let J be a substructure of I such that fa 1 ; : : :; a n g U J .
Then J ; j = B(y 1 ; : : :; y n ).
Proof: Assume I; j = B(y 1 ; : : :; y n ), and denote this condition by the expression I j = B a 1 ; : : :; a n ]. Since B a 1 ; : : :; a n ] is universal it follows that for all b 1 ; : : :; b n 2 U I the condition I j = A b 1 ; : : :; b m ; a 1 ; : : :a n ] is satis ed. Because the formula A(x; y) does not contain quanti ers it follows J j = A b 1 ; : : :; b m ; a 1 ; : : :a n ], provided fb 1 ; : : :; b m ; a 1 ; : : :a n g U J . This implies j = B a 1 ; : : :; a n ]. 2.
Corollary 16 (1) U(I 0 ) = U( ).
(2) ht 1 ; : : :; t n i 2 R I 0 i I j = R(t 1 ; : : :; t n ) and ht 1 ; : : :; t n i 2 e R I 0 i I j = R(t 1 ; : : :; t n ), where R 2 Rel( ). From (2) follows for every quanti er free formula A(x 1 ; : : :; x n ) and terms t 1 ; : : :; t n 2 U( ): (3) I 0 j = A(t 1 ; : : :; t n ) i I j = A(t 1 ; : : :; t n ). Now, let A 2 S, and A = 8x 1 : : :x k G(x 1 ; : : :; x k ). Assume, I 0 6 j = 8x 1 : : :x k G(x), then there is an evaluation such that I 0 ; 6 j = 8xG(x). By de nition this is equivalent to the existence of variable free terms t 1 ; : : :; t n such that I 0 j = ?G(t 1 ; : : :; t n ); by condition (3) this is equivalent to I 6 j = G(t 1 ; : : :; t n ). But then I 6 j = 8x 1 : : :x n G(x) which is a contradiction to the assumption. 2. Proposition 19 Let S be a universal theory, and F = 9xG(x) a closed existential sentence.
Then the following conditions are equivalent:
(1) S j = c F. (2) There are variable free substitutions 1 ; : : :; n such that S j = c W i n G( i (x)).
Proof: Assume S j = c F; since F is an existential sentence this is equivalent to S j = H c F. Proposition 19 can also be proved for j = t and j = 4 . For j = 2 this proposition is Herbrand's theorem.
Minimal Models
In the sequel we introduce several versions of minimal models; we assume that all interpretations under consideration are Herbrand interpretations.
De nition 17 (Extension) Let Proof: Let T < be the theory of linear ordering with rst but without last element; P is a unary predicate satisfying the following property: 9xP(x)^8v8u(P(u)^v > u P(v)), i.e. P is a nonempty co nal segment of the linear ordering. Then every partial model of this theory is not minimal. Observation 11 Let K I H 4 . An interpretation I 2 I H 4 is said to be minimal in K if I 2 K, and there is no J 2 K such that J < I. Then the following holds: An interpretation I 2 I H 4 is minimal in I H t if I is 2-valued.
From the results of section 3 the following observation can be easily derived.
Observation 12 For every set S of universal sentences there is a set of clauses Cl(S) such that Mod (S) = Mod (Cl(S)), 2 f4; c; tg.
Proposition 20 Let S be a universal theory in L( ). Every partial model from I H c of S is an extension of a minimal coherent model of S and can be extended to a maximal coherent model of S.
Proof: Let S be given; we may assume that S is a set of clauses. Let I be a coherent model of S and (I) = fJ : J I; J j = Sg. We show that every decreasing chain I 0 I 1 : : : I n : : : in ( (I); ) has a lower bound. Using Zorn's lemma this implies the existence of a minimal element, which is a minimal partial coherent model of S. Assume I ? = T n2! I n , and I n j = S for every n 2 !. We show that I ? j = S. Choose C 2 S, and C = E 1 _ : : : _ E k _ F 1 _ : : : paraminimal model of T is abcdef; since it is the minimal supermodel of the two minimal models a and b it has rank 1. There are exactly two paraminimal models of rank 2: cdef and bcdef, consequently prk(T) = 2.
Observation 13 Let X Prop( ) contain persistent formulas only. Then prk(X) 1. Proof: Let Min (I) be the set of all minimal submodels of I, and K be a set of submodels of I being models of X. If I is a minimal supermodel of K then by the persistence of X it holds that I = S K. We show that the rank hierarchy stabilizes at 1, i.e. Mod pm (1; X) = Mod pm (2; X). Let Eventually, an important question is: which of the inference relations j = x y for x = m; pm, and y = 4; c; mi, is the natural choice for knowledge systems. We shall see below that the answer to this questions depends also on the logical expressiveness of the language of knowledge bases. In the simplest case, where only extensional knowledge, corresponding to sentences from L( ;^; _), is represented the preferred inference relation is based on paraminimal models, i.e. j = pm mi (resp. j = pm c if only consistent KBs are admitted), as the following example illustrates. 
Compactness Properties
We conclude this section with the investigation of compactness properties. Let F = (L; I; j = ) be a model-theoretic frame. C is semantically compact if for every set X L the following holds: if (X f ) 6 = ; for every nite subset X f X then (X) 6 = ;. In classical logic compactness and semantical compactness coincide. For arbitrary model-theoretic frames this is not longer true. The following facts clarify the relation between compactness and semantical compactness. is strongly semantical compact i for every set X L and formula 2 L the following holds: if (X f ) \ Mod( ) 6 = ; for every nite subset X f X then (X) \ Mod( ) 6 = ;. The following proposition shows the interrelation between these properties.
Proposition 23 Let F = (L; I; j =; ) be a model-theoretic frame. Let C be an inference operation on the language L, and C f be the nitary restriction of C, i.e. dom(C) = fX : X L, X is nite g, and C f (X) = C(X) for all nite subsets X of L. Let C be monotonic, and 0 (C f )(X) = S Y 2Fin(X) C f (Y ). 0 can be considered as an operator extending nitary inference operation to in nitary ones, and if C is monotonic then 0 (C f ) C. If C is monotonic and compact then 0 (C f ) = C, ie. C is uniquely de ned by its nitary restriction via 0 . In case C is not compact, but monotonic, 0 (C) gives an approximation of C from below. If C does not satisfy monotony then there is no well-de ned operator allowing to reconstruct the operation C from its nitary restriction C f . To analyse this phenomenon we use the following notions from Her95]. 
Sequents and Stable Models
Traditionally, Gentzen sequents are used in a schematic way in sequent calculi, such as in 3.3, in order to express valid transitions from one argument schema to another. In other words, a sequent in a sequential inference rule stands for a whole class of propositional substitution instances.
In this section, we propose to use sequents in a non-schematic way for the purpose of representing rule knowledge. A sequent here is not a schematic but a concrete expression representing some piece of knowledge.
We de ne the following classes of sequents. When a knowledge base consists of a set of sequents S Seq 3 , where body formulas may be non-persistent, it may have (para)minimal models which are not intended. This is illustrated by the following example.
Example 6 (Local Closed-World Assumption) Recall that wrt a class of interpretations K, we write K j = F i I j = F for all I 2 K. We denote the set of all sequents from a sequent set S which are applicable in K by S K = fs 2 S] : K j = Bsg Mod m (S) = fpr; ps; qr; qs; pqg Mod pm (S) = fpr; ps; qr; qs; pq; prs; qrs; pqr; pqs; pqrsg Mod ms (S) = fpr; ps; qr; qsg Mod pms (S) = fpr; ps; qr; qs; pq; prs; qrsg Stable models do not exist in all cases. For instance, S = f?p ) pg has exactly one minimal model, Mod m (S) = ffpgg, which is not stable, however. A sequent set, resp. logic program, without stable models will be called unstable. We shall show below that the de nition of answer sets is just a specialization of our notion of a stable model. The same holds for the de nition of stable models of normal logic programs in GL88]. Since these de nitions are based on the Gelfond-Lifschitz-transformation M requiring a speci c rule syntax they are not very general; as a consequence, Gelfond and Lifschitz are not able to treat negation-as-failure as a logical functor, and to allow for arbitrary formulas in the body of a rule. The interpretation of negation-as-failure as weak negation in partial logic according to our stable semantics seems to be the rst general logical treatment of nonmonotonic logic programs. 18 It was already proposed by Wagner in Wag91, Wag94b], but without the full generality of the stable semantics proposed in the present paper.
18
There have been many meta-logical (notably modal logic) proposals, though.
Proposition 30 An answer set of an extended logic program is the diagram of a minimally stable coherent model of the corresponding sequent set S . Partial model theory, being a natural generalization of classical model theory, is able to capture many important distinctions arising in knowledge-based reasoning, such as explicit falsity vs. non-truth, or exact vs. inexact predicates. At the object level, these distinctions can be expressed by means of the two negations of partial logic. While the strong negation is useful to express the explicit falsity or incompatibility of some piece of information, the weak negation, as a non-persistent functor, can be used to express local Closed-World Assumptions and default rules.
